The 12-Day War: A Nuclear Bomb That Shattered the Legitimacy of the Islamic Republic
In the weeks following the end of the conflict known as the “12-Day War” between Iran and Israel, the general mood in Iranian society has been a mixture of shock and despair. Israel’s lightning victories in Lebanon — achieved through large-scale, rapid strikes that eliminated senior commanders of armed groups — along with the swift advances of opposition forces in Syria and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, stirred hope among many that a wave of revolution and regime change, using similar military strategies, would soon reach Iran. However, the failure of these predictions to materialize has led to a sense of frustration and hopelessness in the public mindset.
Many citizens and political activists feel that neither the protest movements of recent years nor even a devastating war with a foreign enemy could shake the Islamic Republic. The brutal suppression of uprisings — from the November 2019 protests to the 2022 movement — and the regime’s survival after the brief war with Israel have created a bitter perception: that perhaps no event can fundamentally alter the current system. The public mood bears a resemblance to the post–Iran-Iraq war era of the 1980s, a time when the regime portrayed its mere survival despite immense war costs as a victory, forcing its opponents into silence. Today, many Iranians anxiously ask: Has it come to this — that even a full-scale war has failed to weaken the regime, and we must resign ourselves to continued authoritarian rule? Or are there signs of deeper transformation hidden beneath the ashes of public despair?
Consequences of the 12-Day War Inside Iran
The sudden and intense war that broke out in June 2025 (Khordad 1404) between Iran and Israel shook both the military and civilian structures of the Islamic Republic over the span of 12 days. During this period, the Israeli Air Force bombarded dozens of sensitive economic, military, and governmental sites in Tehran and other major cities. According to reports, at least 26 provinces in Iran experienced missile or drone attacks during the short war, with the final day of conflict marking a peak in intensity. No precise figures were given for casualties, but Iranian officials acknowledged the deaths of a significant number of their forces in Israeli missile strikes, as well as the tragic deaths of numerous innocent civilians.
A substantial portion of Iran’s nuclear, defense, and missile infrastructure was also damaged, and some senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists were killed in surprise attacks. Nevertheless, the 86-year-old Supreme Leader and the core of the regime’s power survived the assault, and the government managed to agree to a fragile ceasefire and bring the war to a halt after nearly two weeks. From the regime’s perspective, this very act of “survival” against one of the region’s most powerful militaries and its Western backers is seen as a victory.
State media and officials quickly framed the narrative that the Islamic Republic had forced the “enemy” to retreat and had preserved the country’s territorial integrity. Even relatively moderate newspapers such as Etemad wrote that “the most important factor in Iran’s victory in this 12-day battle was national solidarity and cohesion” and urged the government to use the ceasefire as an opportunity to bolster its defense capabilities and “strengthen national unity and public morale.” In this official narrative, the Iranian people’s resistance against foreign aggression is recorded as a proud chapter in history, and the regime seeks to portray itself as the guardian of national security and dignity.
However, behind this triumphant propaganda lies a set of harsh realities that the public is well aware of. Israel’s rapid strikes clearly exposed the depth of foreign intelligence infiltration into Iran’s security apparatus. Many Iranians were stunned to see how, within just a few days, numerous missile bases and depots — built over years at great cost — were destroyed, and top military figures were eliminated one after another. The destruction of industrial centers and infrastructure in several cities, though temporary, revealed the country’s vulnerability — a stark contrast to the repeated claims of strength by government officials.
For years, Islamic Republic leaders had boasted about their missile deterrence power and strategic depth, even promising Israel’s destruction in the near future. But the regime’s actual performance during this war revealed that many of those grandiose slogans were mostly propaganda, and its military capabilities for confronting a direct assault were far more limited than advertised. As a result, alongside patriotic sentiments, a sense of disillusionment and doubt has grown among the more informed sectors of society regarding the regime’s competence.
Many now whisper that while the Islamic Republic may have survived the war, its illusion of invincibility has collapsed, and its managerial and military weaknesses have been laid bare. This critical perspective is not yet widely or openly expressed due to the post-war security clampdown, but on social media and in private gatherings, ordinary people are asking: What did this confrontation really achieve for Iran? The enormous economic damage, the deaths of the country’s youth, and the fear and trauma endured by millions during the bombing — what did it all accomplish? The regime remains in power, the nuclear program has been damaged (though not definitively destroyed), and what’s left is a more shattered economy and a more exhausted populace.
The Impact of the War on Public Sentiment and Social Cohesion
During the days of war, a phenomenon predicted by many analysts partially materialized: the so-called “rally-around-the-flag” effect. That is, when the country came under foreign attack, internal political rifts were significantly reduced, and a kind of national unity — though fragile and temporary — emerged. Even citizens who were deeply critical of the regime found their patriotic feelings stirred in the face of foreign aggression. For example, legendary footballer and government critic Ali Daei announced during the attacks that he would not “stand in the ranks of the foreign enemies of the homeland” and declared he would defend Iran’s territorial integrity. Other prominent sports and cultural figures echoed similar sentiments and called for national unity. Even some well-known dissidents living abroad, long opposed to the Islamic Republic, temporarily softened their tone and condemned the Israeli military strikes.
As a result, during the height of the conflict, no organized domestic opposition was heard, and no significant public demonstrations were held against the regime’s policies. Many ordinary people who, just months before, had been chanting “Death to the Dictator” in the streets, prioritized protecting their families and lives when their cities came under bombardment. They were compelled to seek shelter under the very regime they had once protested against. For the government, this was an unexpected blessing. Analysts noted that since 2022, the Iranian leadership had been in a defensive position against public anger and legitimacy crises. But the onset of a foreign war shifted the narrative in the regime’s favor, and Tehran’s rulers quickly tried to capitalize on this opportunity to rebuild their legitimacy.
State media relentlessly portrayed an image of unity between the people and the state in the face of aggression. Coverage was saturated with images of Basij members and ordinary citizens aiding with emergency relief and urban defense. The Supreme Leader also issued messages from his hiding place, praising the people’s resilience. The regime’s propaganda machinery made a concerted effort to turn the suffering and losses of war into an emotional asset, presenting it as a sign of national loyalty to the system.
However, this apparent unity was less a reflection of trust in the regime and more a result of fear and survival instinct. In other words, Iranian society rallied around the national flag during foreign aggression — but not necessarily around the Supreme Leader or the regime’s ideology. Evidence suggests that many who remained silent during the war, or even fled the country (tens of thousands of residents from Tehran and other major cities sought refuge in safer areas), resumed their criticism once the immediate danger had passed.
Now that a ceasefire has been established, the whispers of dissatisfaction are growing again. People are complaining about prolonged power outages upon returning to their cities, worrying about skyrocketing prices that will likely worsen as the currency markets reopen, and asking why they should endure such hardship when longstanding problems (sanctions, corruption, unemployment) remain unresolved.
Therefore, it can be said that true national cohesion in Iran was highly fragile and temporary. As the fever of war fades, the old rift between state and society is reemerging. Some sociologists even argue that the public’s repressed anger may intensify in the post-war period. In addition to previously unmet demands, people now carry new grievances related to the risk to millions of lives and the destruction of their country.
History offers parallels: in Serbia, the Milosevic government survived 78 days of NATO bombing in 1999, but was overthrown by a mass protest movement one year later, fueled by the very frustrations that war had intensified. Could Iranian society also, after a period of postwar silence, return to the public sphere with renewed energy — driven by the heavy costs of the war and the regime’s exposed weaknesses? This possibility cannot be ruled out. Activists now ask: how can post-war anger and frustration be transformed into a constructive movement for civil resistance and hopeful change, without giving the regime a pretext to crack down under the accusation of “collaboration with the enemy”?
Escalation of Political and Security Repression
While foreign attacks pose a deadly threat to any ruling government, for authoritarian regimes, they also offer a golden opportunity: a chance to consolidate power further and purge dissenters within the system. Evidence suggests that in Tehran, senior officials swiftly began reorganizing security and repression apparatuses after the initial shock of the war.
The Supreme Leader went into hiding at the start of the conflict and remained out of public view even after the ceasefire. Unofficial reports indicate a growing atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion within the highest ranks of the system. Officials are in disbelief at how the enemy was able to uncover such sensitive and strategic operations so easily. Observers say Ayatollah Khamenei fears that Israeli intelligence may have penetrated even his personal security circle — given how rapidly Israeli forces located IRGC commanders and missile depots, internal collaboration seems likely.
In such an atmosphere, wide-scale purges are expected within the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence, and other security agencies. A security affairs researcher, Hamidreza Azizi, has stated that the regime will likely order a sweep of infiltrators — but the question remains: “Who will carry it out?” Even among loyal forces, mutual trust has eroded, and suspicion is rampant.
Still, the Islamic Republic has a record of taking the harshest possible approach during such crises. In the 1980s, following an assassination attempt on Khamenei and during the Iran-Iraq war, a massive wave of political prisoner executions occurred — justified as necessary for “preserving the system during wartime.” Now too, fears are rising that the war-weakened leadership will resort to even more overt repression to intimidate domestic dissent.
Already, many activists and ordinary citizens are worried that the country’s security atmosphere will grow more stifling. Reports indicate that in the days following the war, several individuals in border provinces were arrested on charges of “spying for the enemy,” and multiple mid-level officials were dismissed or interrogated for “failing to protect key facilities.” While these moves are ostensibly aimed at punishing infiltrators, the underlying message is clear: the regime will tolerate no dissent — not even criticism — at this stage.
In particular, IRGC intelligence units, which were blindsided during the war, may now launch new projects to identify and detain critics, labeling them as infiltrators or saboteurs. Internet controls have intensified, and disruptions — initially justified by the wartime emergency — have not yet been fully lifted. These are clear indicators of the regime’s tendency to tighten its political grip after a foreign threat that endangered its survival.
From the perspective of civil rights and personal freedoms, the situation is also deteriorating. Though the war was brief, it gave the government an excuse to implement a de facto state of emergency. For example, during the war, unofficial curfews were enforced in major cities, and military personnel patrolled the streets. Even after the conflict ended, this heavy military presence remains to some degree. Some reports from Tehran describe increased activity by Basij and plainclothes agents in neighborhoods, who, under the pretext of “post-war security,” are harassing civilians.
Civil society activists fear that the regime, citing national security threats, will further restrict the already limited freedoms. The ruling conservatives see the post-war period as an opportunity to restore “order and revolutionary values,” and may intensify their cultural and social repression. In short, Iran’s short-term political outlook following the war is bleak and securitized. The wounded regime is trying to close every gap that opponents might exploit, wielding an iron fist and projecting strength in hopes of using the ceasefire window to recover and reassert control.
What Fate Awaits the Regime? Historical Patterns of Authoritarianism in Crisis
Modern world history is filled with examples that can help clarify the possible fate of the Islamic Republic under the pressure of foreign conflict. When authoritarian and totalitarian regimes face war or external threats, they typically follow one of two divergent paths: some endure the crisis and even reinforce their rule, while others crack under the pressure, opening the door to public resistance and political transformation. The central question is this: which category does Iran most resemble today, and what lessons can be drawn from past experiences?
On one side, numerous historical cases show how external threats can actually strengthen authoritarian rule. The key mechanism in such instances is the “rally around the flag” effect and the justification of repression in the name of national security. For instance, during the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Islamic Republic not only survived but consolidated its newly formed power by suppressing internal opposition under the cover of patriotic mobilization. Ayatollah Khomeini silenced dissent with the slogan “War, war until sedition is eradicated from the world,” and much of society, constrained by wartime conditions, set aside demands for political freedoms. As a result, the regime emerged from the war more centralized and unified than before.
Another case is North Korea, a totalitarian regime that has, for over half a century, used real and perceived threats from the U.S. and neighboring states to maintain a state of perpetual mobilization. The Kim dynasty has portrayed any internal dissent as treason, reducing personal freedoms to nearly zero under the pretext of defending the nation. Neither famine nor international pressure has succeeded in forcing reform or causing the regime’s collapse.
Similarly, Bashar al-Assad in Syria survived a civil war that took on international dimensions, with Western and regional powers involved. With the backing of allies like Iran and Russia, Assad intensified his crackdown on opponents. These examples suggest that an authoritarian regime, if it retains the capacity for repression and can instill a “foreign enemy” narrative in the public mind, may emerge stronger from the ashes of war and crisis. Even losing a war is not necessarily a death sentence for dictators: Saddam Hussein, after being defeated in the 1991 Gulf War, managed to brutally suppress uprisings by Kurds and Shia and remained in power for over a decade until the U.S. invasion in 2003. He spun the defeat in Kuwait as a patriotic struggle against colonialism. Thus, one possible scenario for Iran is that the regime will exploit the war crisis — using ideological propaganda and brute force — to further consolidate power. However, not all authoritarian regimes have been so fortunate. In some cases, war or foreign pressure has served as the very catalyst that accelerated their downfall. Argentina under the military junta is a notable example: in 1982, its generals launched the Falklands War to distract from internal crises. Their humiliating defeat at the hands of the UK destroyed the regime’s credibility, and within a year, the junta fell, paving the way for a return to democracy.
The previously mentioned case of Serbia is another parallel: the 78-day NATO bombing campaign in 1999 devastated the economy and demoralized the population. Though Slobodan Milošević initially claimed victory, a year later, amid accusations of electoral fraud, a war-weary public rose up and removed him from power. Even autocratic empires have historically collapsed after foreign defeats: the military losses of Germany and the Ottoman Empire in World War I brought down their monarchies and gave rise to new governments. The Nazi regime in Germany fell only after its total military defeat in World War II. Though foreign force played a decisive role, domestic factors — protests, internal coups, economic collapse — also activated after military failure and accelerated regime change.
A more Iran-specific case may be the Soviet Union. Roughly a decade after withdrawing from the costly war in Afghanistan, and amid intense economic and military pressure from the U.S., the USSR dissolved in 1991. Though internal reforms and nationalist movements were crucial, the Cold War pressure created conditions for collapse. Thus, a second likely scenario for Iran is that the recent 12-day war acts as a catalyst for regime decline. Although the Islamic Republic emerged from the war without collapse, the deep scars may widen over the coming months and years — especially if domestic discontent flares and the opposition succeeds in rallying the public around the regime’s incompetence and reckless policies.
Iran at a Crossroads: Between Consolidation and Collapse
The Islamic Republic now stands at a decisive crossroads. On one side, there are signs that the regime is choosing the path of intensified authoritarianism, possibly reaching new heights. Political rumors suggest that, in the wake of the war, the IRGC and military forces will gain even more influence within the political system. Some speculate that the next Supreme Leader — whenever Khamenei exits the scene — will likely not be a cleric, but someone approved by the military-security apparatus. Supporters of this analysis argue that the war proved Iran’s regional “Resistance Axis” doctrine — reliance on proxy forces like Hezbollah and Hamas to keep conflict away from Iranian soil — is now ineffective. Iran has become directly vulnerable, so regime survival is increasingly dependent on domestic military strength.
In this scenario, the Islamic Republic may effectively or officially transition into a military dictatorship, with clerical leadership weakened and IRGC commanders assuming power, whether from behind the scenes or in full public view. This would not necessarily mean regime collapse but rather a transformation in its mode of survival — a precedent seen in other ideological regimes that morphed into security states in response to crises. For example, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the Chinese Communist Party quashed the democracy movement and rebuilt its legitimacy on economic growth. In Egypt, after the 2011 revolution and a brief democratic period, General al-Sisi came to power and re-militarized the state.
On the other hand, there is the possibility of gradual regime weakening and eventual collapse. Contrary to Iranian state media, most international outlets describe the recent war as an “embarrassing failure” for the Islamic Republic. Israel succeeded in striking Iran’s nuclear and missile defense systems. The Economist noted that top IRGC commanders were eliminated, and the regime failed to protect vital infrastructure. More importantly, the war shattered the “Resistance Axis” narrative — long the backbone of Iran’s regional strategy. The idea of proxy warfare is now seen not as a deterrent but as a justification for direct retaliation against Iranian territory. The very front that was supposed to act as Iran’s “strategic depth” has become a liability.
Iran’s military infrastructure was built in an era with far less satellite surveillance and real-time intelligence. Its assumptions about secrecy are obsolete. Today, satellite tracking, social media, signal interception, and leaks mean that Iran’s military advantage is severely compromised. Even days after the ceasefire, Iran’s Supreme Leader has not appeared in public — in stark contrast to Israel’s Netanyahu, who made daily public appearances during the war.
This reality forces the Islamic Republic to fundamentally rethink its security doctrine. Continuing as before is no longer viable. Strategic pillars have become vulnerabilities. The age of secrecy is over. What once protected the regime may now become its undoing. For true transformation to occur, both external pressure and internal organization are crucial. The Islamic Republic is a regime willing to suppress or even kill its own people to maintain power. Foreign pressure alone won’t suffice — the decisive factor is how domestic opposition organizes and responds.
During the 12-day war, a significant shift in opposition leadership became apparent. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled crown prince, played a more active and visible role. He issued repeated messages, gave interviews, and presented himself as a key spokesperson for the opposition. Leveraging his symbolic status and personal connections — including with Netanyahu — he sought to coordinate the scattered opposition abroad. Yet many within the opposition, especially republicans and leftist factions, were skeptical or opposed. These groups, which emphasize grassroots independence and reject foreign intervention, warned that any perceived alliance with Israel or the U.S. could delegitimize the movement in the eyes of Iranians. Their position remains that meaningful change must come from within and be achieved by the Iranian people — not through war. Still, history shows that overthrowing deeply entrenched dictatorships often requires some form of external help. While total dependence on foreign powers is risky, strategic cooperation has been essential in many cases — as seen in Bosnia, where oppressed groups only forced regime concessions through smart, targeted use of foreign support.
The latest confrontation with the Islamic Republic has not yet yielded definitive results, but it represents an important new chapter in the struggle against tyranny. Comparisons to Syria or Lebanon may be misleading — Iran is fundamentally different. Syria’s opposition was long-established before war broke out. Lebanon’s state competes with a non-state actor, Hezbollah. But Iran remains a centralized regime with internal cohesion, residual public support, and powerful security organs. Therefore, Iran’s path will be longer, more complex, and require greater patience. The regime has emerged from the war structurally weakened. The economy is near collapse. The national currency has suffered its worst decline in history. Even before the war, basic infrastructure like the power grid was deteriorating. The regime’s ideological legitimacy is at a low, particularly after the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, and the state-society divide is deeper than ever. Many senior regime figures have been killed, and core defense projects linked to them have failed.
Now, the regime faces two risky options:
- Seek agreement with the West, compromise on the nuclear program, and reduce sanctions to stabilize the economy — but this requires ideological retreat and could alienate hardliners.
- Pursue further isolation, potentially ramping up efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent — risking wider war or North Korea–style total isolation.
Either path offers civil society a window: to push for political and cultural reform under de-escalation, or, under extreme isolation and rising misery, to break the final link in the chain of tyranny.
Conclusion: Hope, Awareness, and Resilience
Today, a heavy atmosphere of despair hangs over Iran. A young generation that once poured into the streets with dreams of freedom and a better life has returned home, disillusioned by brutal repression, and now witnesses that even a devastating war has failed to shift the balance of power. And yet, social history teaches us that periods of darkness and hopelessness can be preludes to the dawn of transformation. Authoritarian regimes appear invincible—until they suddenly collapse, unable to foresee even the smallest cracks of change.
Perhaps the year 1404 in the Iranian calendar (2025 CE) will be seen by some observers as a time of the regime’s apparent dominance over society. But beneath the surface, a different current is flowing. Both Iran’s historical experience and global precedents suggest that change may be gradual—but it is ultimately inevitable. Even now, the Islamic Republic, despite its rigidity, is suffering from an internal erosion of legitimacy and competence. A large portion of the population, particularly the youth, no longer sees it as a representation of their ideals. The 12-day war did not heal this rift—it may, in the long run, widen it: a regime that once claimed to bring security has now become the very cause of insecurity within its borders.
Yes, in the short term, repression may intensify. Protest voices may be silenced under military boots. But this is not the end of the road. Iran’s civil movements in recent years have shown that every wave of repression gives rise to new forms of creative resistance: from the “Girls of Revolution Street” in 2017 to the “My Stealthy Freedom” campaign, from workers’ strikes to online activism — all reflect the enduring spirit of resistance among the Iranian people.
We must remember that hope is the engine of historical change — not blind or naive hope, but informed, deliberate hope. This kind of hope comes from a sober understanding of how difficult the path is, yet a firm belief that tyranny is not everlasting. If Iran’s political and civil activists can learn from past experiences, maintain unity, pursue nonviolent resistance, and stay focused on shared goals, then small openings for transformation will inevitably appear. These changes may be slow and incremental — but as Nelson Mandela once said after years of struggle: “It always seems impossible until it’s done.”
The people of Iran, with their immense cultural wealth and a turbulent yet proud history, have proven time and again that they are worthy of a democratic government — one that respects their dignity. If the 12-day war was, on the surface, a showcase of the regime’s decaying power, beneath it was a warning of how precariously it now walks the edge.
Now that the fire of war has subsided, the flame of hope for the future must not be extinguished. On the contrary, by learning from the past and staying vigilant in the present, this crisis can be transformed into a launchpad for a better future. The Iranian nation has endured countless severe tests throughout history, and time after time, has emerged from the darkest nights into the light of day. Without doubt, it will happen again — provided that society remains aware, united, and committed to its demands, and believes that “even the longest night of oppression will eventually come to an end.”